Kiley Miller and John Rzeczycki v. San Juan County, a Utah Politcal Subdivision, Red Rock 4-Wheelers, Inc., and State of Utah by and through the School and Institutional Trust Lands Administration, and John and Jane Does 1-5 : Brief of Appellant by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2007
Kiley Miller and John Rzeczycki v. San Juan
County, a Utah Politcal Subdivision, Red Rock
4-Wheelers, Inc., and State of Utah by and through
the School and Institutional Trust Lands
Administration, and John and Jane Does 1-5 : Brief
of Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Paul Mortensen; Hanks and Mortensen; Walter J. Bird; Deputy San Juan County Attorney; Thomas
A. Mitchell; Attorneys for Appellees/Defendants.
Bruce R. Baird; Alain C. Balmanno; Hutchings Baird Curtis and Astill; Attorneys for Appellants/
Plaintiffs.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Miller v. San Juan County, No. 20070546 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2007).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3/365
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
KILEY MILLER and JOHN RZECZYCKI 
Plaintiffs/ Appellants 
vs. 
SAN JUAN COUNTY, a Utah Political 
Subdivision; RED ROCK 4-WHEELERS, 
iNC. AND STATE OF UTAH by and through 
the SCHOOL AND INSTITUTIONAL 
TRUST LANDS ADMINISTRATION, and 
JOHN and JANE DOES 1-5 
Defendants/ Appelles. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
Case No. 20070546 CA 
Appeal from the Seventh District Court, San Juan County, Judge Lyle R. Anderson 
Attorneys for Appellee/Defendant Red Rock 4-Wheelers: 
Paul Mortensen 
Hanks & Mortensen 
8 East Broadway, Suite 740 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111-2204 
Attorney for Appellee/Defendant San Juan County: 
Walter J. Bird, 
Deputy San Juan County Attorney 
117 South Main 
PO Box 9 
Monticello, Utah 84535 
Attorney for SITLA: 
Thomas A. Mitchell 
675 East 500 South, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, UT 84102 
Attorneys for Appellants/Plaintiffs: 
Bruce R. Baird (#0176) 
Alain C. Balmanno (#3985) 
HUTCHLNGS BAIRD CURTIS & ASTILL 
9537 South 700 East 
Sandy, Utah 84070 
Telephone: (801)328-1400 
Facsimile: (801) 328-1444 ^ - n-cc 
Email: bbaird@iibcalaw.com s A H APPELLATE P< 
TABLE OF CONTENT 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 3 
a. Cases 3 
b. Rules 3 
c. Statutes 3 
JURISDICTION 3 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 4 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 4 
a. Nature of the case: 4 
b. Course of the proceedings: 5 
c. Disposition at trial court: 5 
RELEVANT FACTS 6 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 6 
DETAILS OF THE ARGUMENT 7 
1. Rule 41(b) does not apply to the Order in the prior case, and its application was 
error 7 
2. The language of the Order in the prior case limits its res judicata and claim 
preclusion effect 8 
3. Trial Courts have the authority to limit the preclusive effect of decisions 10 
CONCLUSION 11 
2 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
a. Cases 
Maoris & Assocs. v. Neways, Inc., 2000 UT 93, P17, 16 P.3d 1214 4 
American Estate Mgmt Corps v. International Inv. & Dev. Corps, 1999 UT App 232, 986 
P.2d765 10 
Beaver County v. Qwest, Inc., 2001 UT81«[[ 19; 31 P.3d 1147 7 
C&Y Corp. v. Gen. Biometrics, Inc., 896 P.2d 47, 53 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) 4 
Equity Fed, Inc. v. Phillips Dev., LC, 2002 UT 56 fflf 13 and 16; 52 P.3d 1137 7 
Federated Department Stores v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394 (1981) 10 
Handy v. Union Pacific R.R., 841 P. 2d 1210 (Utah App. 1992) 8 
In reJ.J.T., 877 P.2d 161 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) 11 
Meagher v. Equity Oil Co., 299 P. 2d 827 (1956) 10 
Southern Title Guar. Co. v. Bethers, 761 P.2d951 (Utah App. 1988 8 
W. M. Barnes Co. v. Sohio Natural resources Co., 627 P. 2d 56 (Utah 1981) 8 
b. Rules 
Utah R. Civ. P 41(b) passim 
c. Statute 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)0) 3 
JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j). 
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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
a. i) The Court below ruled that an Order in a prior case between these parties was 
binding on the parties in a new action, although the Order in the prior case read "this 
ruling applies only to this action and, except in this action, shall have no affect of legal or 
factual precedent, res judicata, collateral estoppel or other issue preclusion on the parties 
hereto, those in privity with them, or on any other persons or action." 
In its decision, the Court below relied on language in Utah R. Civ. P. 41(b). This 
is an error of law because Rule 41(b) is not applicable to the Order in the prior case 
which was a grant of summary judgment to the Defendants/Appellees, not a dismissal of 
an action. 
ii) Standard of Review. The Court of Appeals reviews a trial court's application of rule 
41(b) for correctness. C&YCorp. v. Gen. Biometrics, Inc., 896 P.2d 47, 53 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1995). 
b. i) The Court below further held that the Order in the prior case was effective to create 
claim preclusion. This was also error because res judicata is claim preclusion, and res 
judicata was expressly withheld from the application of the Order in the prior case, 
ii) Standard of Review. The determination of whether res judicata bars an action 
presents a question of law which is reviewed for correctness. Macris & Assocs. v. 
Neways, Inc., 2000 UT 93, P17, 16 P.3d 1214. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
a. Nature of the case: This appeal is from a final Order of Dismissal with 
4 
Pi CJudice issued by the Honorable Judge Lyle R Anderson, in the Seventh Judicial 
District Court for San Juan County, Utah, on a motion to dismiss made by 
Defendants/Appellees 
b Course of the proceedings Plaintiffs/Appellants (the 'Landowners') filed a 
complaint seeking declaratory, injunctive relief and damages for wrongful use of 
Plaintiffs' land by the Defendants/Appellees ('RR4W and the County' or 'Defendants') 
The claims were essentially the same as those forming the basis of a prior case between 
the same parties, decided by the same lower Court m March 2006 The Defendants filed 
a Motion to Dismiss Complaint with Prejudice, arguing 1) issue preclusion, 2) res 
judicata, 3) no means of meaningful relief, and 4) bad faith on the parts of the Plaintiffs 
The Landowners opposed the Motion to Dismiss, noting the Order m the prior case 
piovided that "this mhng applies only to this action and, except in this action, shall have 
no affect of legal or factual precedent, res judicata, collateral estoppel or other issue 
preclusion on the parties hereto, those m privity with them, or on any other persons or 
action " 
c Disposition at trial court The Court below issued its ruling granting the 
Motion to Dismiss, finding that the Order in the prior case "does not state that the Order 
is a dismissal without prejudice or that it does not operate as an adjudication upon the 
merits " The Court below applied Rule 41(b) to its prior Order, and concluded that the 
ordei m the prior case is "most reasonably interpreted to eliminate any issue preclusion 
effect of the Older in any other dispute involving" these parties 
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RELEVANT FACTS 
All relevant facts are taken form the trial court's Order of Dismissal with 
Prejudice (Order), which is attached to this Brief. 
1. This case involves the same parties and the same claims as one previously 
decided by the same trial court in March 2005. Order at 1. 
2. The Order in the prior case contained the following language in its paragraph 
2(c): 'This ruling applies only to this action and, except in this action, shall have no 
affect of legal or factual precedent, res judicata, collateral estoppel or other issue 
preclusion on the parties hereto, those in privity with them, or on any other persons or 
action." Order at 2. 
3. The Order in the prior case was a grant of summary judgment in favor of the 
Defendants/Appelles. Order at 3.1 
The issues presented in this appeal turn on the meaning of the language in 
paragraph 2(c) of the Order in the prior case. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The Landowners argue that: 
1
 The Order in the prior case strangely held that the Plaintiffs had acquired the property 
subject to a temporary easement of indefinite duration. Order at 2. One strains to 
understand how a temporary easement can be of indefinite duration. The Trial Court so 
held in spite of the fact that no easement was recorded against the property when 
Plaintiffs purchased the property, that Red Rock 4-Wheeler and San Juan County failed 
to seek a permanent easement when they could have, that SITLA denied having any 
obligation to grant such an easement (and denying that the statute in question provides for 
such an easement), and that public notice was given by SITLA that the property was 
being sold and that the temporary easement would thus be extinguished. 
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1. Rule 41(b) does not apply to the Order in the prior case because Rule 41(b) 
applies to dismissals and the Order in the prior case granted summary judgment pursuant 
to Rule 56. Rule 41(b) must be interpreted in accordance with the plain language of the 
Rule. 
2. Even if Rule 41(b) did apply to the Order in the prior case, the language of 
paragraph 2(c) of that order specifically limited the application of the Order in future 
cases. The language of paragraph 2(c) is clear and unambiguous, and limits the 
application of the Order by providing that the ruling is to have no affect of legal or 
factual precedent, no res judicata, no collateral estoppel, and no issue preclusion on the 
parties to the first case. 
3. Trial courts have the power to limit the preclusive effect of rulings, and to 
curtail the application of res judicata and claim preclusion. 
DETAILS OF THE ARGUMENT 
1. Rule 4Kb) does not apply to the Order in the prior case, and its application was error. 
Rule 41(b) applies to dismissal of actions. See text of Rule 41(b) in Addendum. 
Courts interpreting Rule 41 do so according to the plain language of the Rule. First 
Equity Fed, Inc. v. Phillips Dev., LC, 2002 UT 56 1fl[ 13 and 16; 52 P.3d 1137 (we 
therefore construe Rule 41 ... to mean exactly what it says"); Beaver County v. Qwest, 
Inc., 2001 UT 81 t 19; 31 P.3d 1147. 
The Rule is titled "Dismissal of actions." Rule 41(b) applies when a defendant 
moves for dismissal of a claim upon failure of the plaintiff to prosecute or to comply with 
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the rules of evidence or to obey any order of the court. It also applies when the court is 
the trier of fact as when a matter is tried to the court without a jury, and the court 
determines that the plaintiff has not met its burden of proof. 
Courts applying Rule 41(b) must weigh the evidence and decide its sufficiency. 
Southern Title Guar. Co. v. Bethers, 761 P.2d 951 (Utah App. 1988); Handy v. Union 
Pacific R.R., 841 P. 2d 1210 (Utah App. 1992). The procedure for a court to grant 
summary judgment is completely different. A court granting summary judgment is 
specifically precluded from weighing the evidence, and can only grant summary 
judgment if there are no issues of material facts. See e.g. W. M. Barnes Co. v. Sohio 
Natural resources Co., 627 P. 2d 56 (Utah 1981). Because the Order in the prior case 
was a grant of summary judgment, Rule 41(b) did not apply to that Order. 
2. The language of the Order in the prior case limits its res judicata and claim preclusion 
effect. 
Paragraph 2(c) of the Order in the prior case specifically limits the application of 
that Order. That language is clear, and on its face, allows the filing of this new action. 
The ruling is to have no affect of legal or factual precedent, no res judicata, no collateral 
estoppel, and no issue preclusion on the parties to the first case. Specifically, the 
language of paragraph 2(c) states: 
This ruling applies only to this action and, except in this 
action, shall have no affect of legal or factual precedent, res 
judicata, collateral estoppel or other issue preclusion on the 
parties hereto, those in privity with them, or on any other 
persons or action. 
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That language says that the ruling shall have no legal affect on the parties, "except in this 
[First Case]". The First Case ended when the time for appeal on that case expired. The 
language of Paragraph 2C specifically precludes the application of "res judicata, 
collateral estoppel or other issue preclusion" to the parties in any subsequent action. 
"Except in this [First Case]" the order has no legal affect "on the parties hereto". 
The Court below concluded that if the Order in the previous case was interpreted 
as suggested by the Landowners, the Order in the previous case would have no effect in 
resolving the claims presented in that case. Order at 4. The Landowners submit that is 
exactly the effect of the plain language of paragraph 2(c) of the Order in the prior case. 
In its holding the Trial Court reasoned that the language in paragraph 2(c) is "most 
reasonably interpreted to eliminate any issue preclusion effect of the Order in any other 
dispute" between the parties, noting that "the parties were understandably concerned 
about the effect of the Order on any other disputes that might arise." Id at 3-4. The Trial 
Court may have been right had the language of paragraph 2(c) provided that the Order 
would 'not have res judicata effect as to any future issues, not decided in this Order, 
which may arise between the parties and their privies.' But that is not what the Order in 
the prior case provides. It does not limit itself to future claims not adjudicated in the first 
case. It states quite clearly that the ruling applies only to that action, not to the issues 
raised in that action. 
The Trial Court also observed that it would not have signed the prior Order if any 
one had "hinted that the order failed to [operate as an adjudication on the merits, and 
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finally resolve this dispute between these parties]." Order at 3. No matter what the 
Court intended, the Order reads as written, and the interpretation suggested by the Trial 
Court and by the Defendants is more than a perfunctory or clerical mistake the Court can 
correct on its own motion. See Meagher v. Equity Oil Co., 299 P. 2d 827 (1956). 
Nor is this a situation where the Trial Court can, by operation of its Order in the 
second case, modify pursuant to Rule 60(b), its order entered in the first case. The 
language in paragraph 2(c), whatever its intent, should be interpreted on its own plain 
meaning at this juncture. 
3. Trial Courts have the authority to limit the preclusive effect of decisions. 
As observed by Justice Blakmun, concurring in Federated Department Stores v. 
Moitie, 452 U.S. 394 (1981), "there are cases in which the doctrine of res judicata must 
give way to ... overriding concerns of public policy and simple justice." Justice 
Blakmun also quoted from Moore's Federal Practice that "just as res judicata is 
occasionally qualified by an overriding, competing principle of public policy, so 
occasionally it needs an equitable tempering." 
The argument that res judicata is not without its exceptions, is not foreign to Utah 
jurisprudence. Utah law recognizes that defining the scope of a claim or cause of action 
is not an exact science, and that claim preclusion may at times be driven by the relative 
importance of the finality of the prior judgment. See American Estate Mgmt Corps v. 
International Inv. & Dev. Corps, 1999 UT App 232, 986 P.2d 765. Moreover, Utah 
courts have also recognized that in some situation judicial economy and the convenience 
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afforded by the finality of legal controversies do not override other concerns. See e.g. In 
reJJ.T., 877 P.2d 161 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
In this case the concern which needs to be protected is that the plain language and 
plain meaning of court orders must be protected, once those orders are final. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court of Appeals should reverse the Order below, and return the case to the 
Trial Court for further proceedings. The Defendants' Motion to Dismiss should be 
denied. 
DATED this J ^ / i ^ d a y of October 2007. 
HUTCHINGS BAIRD CURTIS & ASTILL PLLC 
CO! 
Bruce R Baird 
Alain C. Balmanno 
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Addendum 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SAN JUAN COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 




SAN JUAN COUNTY, a Utah 
Political Subdivision, RED 
ROCK 4-WHEELERS, INC., and 
JOHN and JANE DOES, and STATE 
OF UTAH by and through SCHOOL 
AND INSTITUTIONAL TRUST LANDS 
ADMINISTRATION, and JOHN DOES 
1-5, 
Defendants . I 
ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITH 
PREJUDICE 
Case No.0707-33 
This court is called upon to decide whether the order entered 
in the earlier case involving these same parties and the same 
dispute operates to bar the claims now asserted by plaintiffs. The 
court rules that it does. 
The order of this court in Miller, v. San Juan County, Civil 
No. 0407-37, is found by merging the Order dated March 3, 2005, 
with the Order Modifying March 3, 2005 Order and Dismissing 
Defendants' Supplemental Counterclaims and Third-Party Complaints. 
As thus merged, it reads as follows: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows: 
1. Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment is denied. 
Plaintiffs erroneously argue that persons who historically 
obtained a permit for the Jeep Safari cannot benefit from a 
public easement. There is at least a genuine issue of fact 
about whether the public enjoys an easement to traverse 
plaintiffs' property. Red Rock 4-Wheelers, Inc. (URR4W") and 
members of the public participating in the Jeep Safari have no 
less right to traverse plaintiffs1 property than the general 
public. 
2. Defendants' motions for partial summary judgment are 
granted as follows: 
A. Uncontradicted evidence having been presented that the 
Strike Ravine trail had been constructed and maintained 
or used by a responsible authority and existed prior to 
January 1, 1992, the court determines that San Juan 
County (the "County") holds for the public, and RR4W, 
holds for its own uses pursuant to Section 75-5-201, Utah 
Code, a temporary public easement or right-of-way to use 
the Strike Ravine trail. All members of the public have 
the right to travel the Strike Ravine trail. This 
temporary public easement was not extinguished when the 
State of Utah sold the land across which the Strike 
Ravine trail passes to the plaintiffs. The purpose a 
member of the public has in traveling the Strike Ravine 
trail is irrelevant. 
B. Plaintiffs acquired the property subject to the 
temporary easement. The temporary easement exists until 
a permanent easement is established under Section 72-5-
203(2). Under plaintiffs' and State Institutional and 
Trust Lands Administration's {"SI TLA") position no 
permanent easement can be granted (unless the property 
reverts to SITLA). This means the temporary easement is 
of indefinite duration. Only if plaintiffs were to 
forfeit under the certificate of sale or if SITLA were to 
otherwise resume all equitable as well as legal title 
would RR4W and the County potentially be able to apply 
for a permanent easement. 
C. This ruling applies only to this action and, except in 
this action, shall have no effect of legal or factual 
precedent, res judicata, collateral estoppel or other 
issue preclusion on the parties hereto, those in privity 
with them, or on any other persons or actions. 
Plaintiffs argue that, once a new action is filed, the Order 
in Civil No. 0407-3 7 has no further effect. In effect, plaintiffs 
argue that their claims in Civil No. 0407-37 were dismissed without 
prejudice and can now be relitigated. The County and RR4W argue 
that paragraph 2.C. only operates to limit the effect of the Order 
to this particular dispute. 
Rule 41(b), U.R.C.P. provides as follows: 
Unless the court in its order for dismissal otherwise 
provides... any dismissal... operates as an adjudication 
upon the merits. 
This court certainly intended that its decision, reached only 
after several hearings, and mind-bending analysis of che pertinent 
statutes, would operate as an adjudication on the merits, and 
finally resolve this dispute between these parties. Had anyone 
hinted that the Order failed to accomplish that, this court would 
have refused to sign the Order until after appropriate changes had 
been made. 
Nevertheless, whatever the court intended, it must consider 
whether the Order has a different effect. The court rules that it 
does not for the following reasons: 
1. Paragraph 2.C. does not state that the Order is a dismissal 
without prejudice or that it does not operate as an adjudication on 
the merits. The Order must therefore be read as an adjudication 
upon the merits of the presented claims. An adjudication upon the 
merits is a final resolution of presented claims with prejudice. 
2. Paragraph 2.C. is most reasonably interpreted to eliminate 
any "issue preclusion" effect of the Order in any other dispute 
involving SITLA, RR4W, the County, or plaintiffs. Because of the 
peculiar and puzzling nature of this dispute, the parties were 
understandably concerned about the effect of the Order on any other 
disputes that might arise. However, they clearly intended that the 
Order have "claim preclusion" effect in "this action," namely Civil 
No. 040 7-2 7. To read paragraph 2.C. as plaintiffs advocate would 
mean that the Order had no effect in resolving the claims presented 
in Civil No. 0407-37. 
The claims presented by plaintiffs in this case being 
identical to those raised and dismissed in Civil No. 0407-37, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiffs complaint be dismissed 
with prejudice. Defendants' request for attorney fees is denied 
because defendants have not claimed, much less shown, that 
plaintiffs' arguments are completely lacking in merit. 
No further Order of the court is required. 
DATED this ^ f^day of May, 2007. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I mailed, hand delivered, or faxed, a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing Order of Dismissal with 
Prejudice, this cxQ day of May, 2 0 07, to the following: 
Paul W. Mortensen 
Hanks & Mort ens en, P.C. 
Attorney for Defendants Red Rock 4-Wheelers, Inc. 
8 East Broadway, Suite 740 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Bruce R. Baird 
Hutchings Baird Curtis & Astill, P.L.L.C. 
9537 South 700 East 
Sandy, UT 84070 
Walter J. Bird 
Deputy San Juan County Attorney 
PO Box 9 
Monticello, UT 84535 
Thomas A. Mitchell 
School and Institutional Trust Lands Administration 
675 East 500 South, #500 
Salt Lake City, UT 84102
 & 
Deputfy Court Clerk 
Rule 41 Dismissal of actions. 
(d) Voluntary dismissal effect thereof 
UiA1) By plaintiff Subject to the provisions of Rule 23(e), of Rule 66(i) and of any applicable statute, an 
d( tion may be dismissed by the plaintiff without order of court by filing a notice of dismissal at any time 
before set vice by the adverse party of an answer or other response to the complaint permitted under tnese 
rules Unless otherwise stated in the notice of dismissal, the dismissal is without prejudice, except that a 
notice of dismissal operates as an adjudication upon the merits when filed by a plaintiff who has once 
dismissed in any court of the United States or of any state an action based on or including the same claim 
(a)(2) By order of court Unless the plaintiff timely files a notice of dismissal under paragraph (1) of this 
subdivision of this rule an action may only be dismissed at the tequest of the plaintiff on order of the court 
based either on 
»/(2)(i) a stipu.ation of all of the parties who have appeared in the action 01 
(a)(2)(n) upon such terms and conditions as the court deems proper If a counterclaim has been pleaded by 
a defendant prior to the service upon him of the plaintiffs motion to dismiss, the action shall not be 
dismissed against the defendant's objection unless the counterclaim can remain pending for independent 
^'judication by the couit Unless otherwise specified in the order a dismissal under this paragraph is 
without prejudice 
fb) Involuntary dismissal effect thereof For failure of the plaintiff to prosecute or to comply with these rules 
ot any order of court a defendant may move for dismissal of an action or of any claim against him After the 
^ untiff in an action tried by the court without a jury has completed the presentation of his evidence the 
defendant, without waiving his right to offer evidence in the event the motion is not granted, may move for a 
dismissal on the ground that upon the facts and the law the plaintiff has shown no right to relief The court as 
trier of the facts may then determine them and render judgment against the plaintiff or may decline to render 
any judgment until the close of all the evidence If the court renders judgment on the merits against the 
plaintiff the court shall make findings as provided in Rule 52(a) Unless the court in its order for dismissal 
otherwise specifies, a dismissal under this subdivision and any dismissal not provided for in this rule, other 
than a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction or for improper venue or for lack of an indispensable party, operates 
as an adjudication upon the merits 
(O Dismissal of counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim The provisions of this rule apply to the 
dismissal of any counterclaim cross-claim, or third-party claim A voluntary dismissal by the claimant alone 
pursuant to Paiagraph (1) of Subdivision (a) of this rule shall be made before a responsive pleading is 
served or, if there is none before the introduction of evidence at the trial or hearing 
(Jj Costs of previously-dismissed action If a plaintiff who has once dismissed an action jn any court 
commences an action based upon or including the same claim against the same defendant the court may 
make such oiderfoi the payment of costs of the action previously dismissed as it may deem pioper and may 
stay the proceedings in the action until the plaintiff has complied with the order 
e Bona or undertaking to be dehveied to adveise paity Should a party dismiss his complaint 
, unterclaim, cross-claim or third-party claim, pursuant to Subdivision (a)(1)(i) above, after a provisional 
r
~ nedy has been allowed such party the bond or undertaking filed in support of such provisional remedy 
must thereupon be delivered by the court to the adverse party against whom such provisional remedy was 
obtained 
